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Caroline E. Sweet* 
The Hidden Scam: Why Consumers Should No 
Longer Be Forced to Shoulder the Burden of 
Liability for Mobile Cramming 
Introduction 
“Mobile cramming” is a fraudulent form of mobile phone billing that 
systematically siphons money away from unknowing consumers.1 Part I of this 
comment provides an introduction to how and why mobile cramming occurs.2 Part 
II gives a brief overview of federal regulation of mobile billing fraud with a 
particular focus on the Federal Trade Commission.3 In addition, Part II discusses 
why the Federal Trade Commission’s efforts to stop mobile cramming are 
insufficient, and explains how the Commission’s approach has played a role in the 
lackluster industry practices concerning mobile billing fraud.4 Finally, Part III 
proposes that mobile cramming regulation should emulate the federally-mandated 
consumer protections against credit card fraud and implement a cap on consumer 
liability for mobile cramming.5 
I. MOBILE CRAMMING: A PERFECT CONSUMER FRAUD SCHEME 
Most people expect that the bold-print grand total on page one of their lengthy 
mobile phone bill reflects what they owe the phone company that month. In 
contrast, many do not expect that their mobile phone bill can actually include 
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charges from companies other than their phone carrier.6 Surprisingly, this practice 
has been around long before mobile phones became prevalent.7 Unsurprisingly, it 
has become the target of opportunists seeking the perfect scam; an issue which the 
Federal Trade Commission has devoted a great deal of effort to preventing.8 
A. What is Mobile Cramming, Exactly? 
Mobile cramming is a fraudulent practice in which a company other than a mobile 
phone carrier (e.g., Sprint or Verizon) places charges on a consumer’s mobile 
telephone bill that the consumer did not authorize.9 
Since the Telecommunications Act of 199610 was enacted, parties other than a 
consumer’s telephone carrier have been able to place charges on consumers’ 
telephone bills (also known as “third-party billing”).11 Third-party billing is itself a 
legitimate, convenient, and alternative payment method that allows consumers to 
charge purchases to their mobile phone bill instead of a credit or debit card.12 
However, a consumer must expressly and knowingly authorize these charges from a 
third-party.13 ‘Crammers’ add charges to a consumer’s bill without obtaining 
 6. According to a Vermont study, “close to 80 percent” of consumers are completely unaware that “they 
could be charged for third-party goods and services on their mobile phone bills.” FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
TRANSCRIPT OF THE MOBILE CRAMMING ROUNDTABLE 12 (2013) [hereinafter TRANSCRIPT]. 
 7. See infra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. FED. TRADE COMM’N,  CRAMMING ON WIRELESS PHONE BILLS: A REVIEW OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 
PRACTICES AND GAPS 1 (2014) (“Mobile cramming is the act of placing unauthorized third-party charges on 
mobile phone accounts.”). 
 10. 47 U.S.C.S. § 252 (LexisNexis 2015). 
 11. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, & TRANSPORTATION, 112TH CONG., REP. ON 
UNAUTHORIZED CHARGES ON TELEPHONE BILLS, at i (Comm. Print 2011) (noting that “telephone companies 
opened their billing platforms to an array of third-party vendors offering a variety of services” in the 1990s); 
James Hood, Wireless Carriers—Minus Verizon—Agree to Stop Unauthorized Third-
Party Charges, CONSUMER AFFAIRS (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.consumeraffairs.com/cramming-lawsuits-and-
scams (explaining that third-party billing was initially authorized by Congress when it “included the provision 
that telephone carriers must pass on bills submitted by third-party providers” in the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996). 
 12. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, & TRANSPORTATION, 113TH CONG., REP. ON WIRELESS 
BILLING PRACTICES 3 (Comm. Print 2014) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT] (noting that, “[o]ver time, telephone 
companies opened [their] billing platforms to an array of other third- party vendors that offered products and 
services beyond those directly related to phone service – from webhosting, to online gaming, online photo 
storage, and roadside assistance,” and stating that this system “became a payment method similar to credit card 
numbers”); see also TRANSCRIPT, supra note 6, at 7, 16 (noting that the “mobile marketplace . . . offers incredible 
opportunities for consumers to shop and make payments through their mobile devices,” and is a tool for 
“tremendous good” by “enabl[ing] a wide range of individuals who have no other access or means to support 
causes and charities”). 
 13. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 12 (describing the third-party billing process for the former most 
common type of third-party billing, Premium Short Message Service (PSMS), as requiring consumers to make 
“two affirmative acts when purchasing goods or services with their mobile phone: one to initiate the purchase 
and one to confirm the purchase”). 
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appropriate consumer authorization.14 Some crammers will elicit a consumer’s 
authorization through deception, while others begin charging consumers’ phone 
bills absent any customer contact.15 Although most consumers are unaware that 
mobile cramming exists, the problem is not small: almost 20 million people a year 
are crammed.16 
B. With Mobile Cramming, What You Don’t Know Really Can Harm You 
For those interested in making money through fraud, third-party billing is great 
business. There are a couple of factors that make mobile cramming particularly 
dangerous to consumers and profitable for crammers. First, third-party companies 
(hereinafter referred to as “content providers”)17 easily avoid having to obtain 
express authorization to charge consumers.18 Second, crammed charges are very 
difficult to detect, allowing consumers to be scammed for long periods of time.19 
1. Mobile Crammers Easily Circumvent Obtaining Express Consumer Authorization 
As previously mentioned, content providers can charge a consumer’s phone bill 
only with a consumer’s express approval.20 Unfortunately, mobile crammers often 
gain access to consumer phone bills without such authorization. A form of third-
party billing called Premium Short Message Service (“PSMS”)21 provides a good 
 14. See supra note 9. 
 15. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9 (“Companies that place crammed charges sometimes obtain 
consumers’ phone numbers without any contact with consumers. Other times, these entities use deceptive 
means to obtain consumers’ mobile phone numbers—such as in connection with offering free prizes—and then 
begin charging their phone accounts for recurring third-party charges for purported services unrelated to the 
offer.”). 
 16. Herb Weisbaum, FCC Proposes Crackdown on Phone-Bill Cramming, NBCNEWS.COM, 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/43728825/ns/business-consumer_news/t/fcc-proposes-crackdown-phone-bill-
cramming/#.VNPQ4sZhgS0 (last visited Dec. 13, 2015) (“The FCC estimates that as many as 20 million people 
are crammed each year.”).  
 17. Third-party companies that place charges on mobile phone bills are referred to interchangeably as 
“content providers,” “third-party vendors,” and “third-party merchants” by the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Federal Trade Commission. See generally, SENATE REPORT, 
supra note 12; FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9. 
 18. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 19. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 20. See Supra note 13. 
 21. PSMS billing is a form of billing in which customers authorize the placement of charges on their 
mobile phone bill through text message, by sending a confirmatory text message to the third-party content 
provider. The Senate Committee on Commerce described the PSMS process from the consumer’s perspective as 
follows: 
The advertisement would tell the consumer to send a text to the shortcode “12345” with the 
message “music” to buy the song list in the ad. The consumer would take this step, then receive a 
message confirming the content ordered, which would reiterate much of the information 
provided in the original advertisement, including program sponsor, price, frequency of product, 
how to ask for help with the product purchase, and any additional carrier costs. After confirming 
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example. Content providers billing via PSMS must acquire a consumer’s phone 
number to charge for services or products22 (such as text message subscriptions and 
ringtones).23 Some PSMS crammers have successfully captured mobile phone 
numbers by sending consumers unsolicited text messages that look like “spam” or 
appear to be “sent in error.”24 The crammer then proceeds to sign up and bill the 
consumer, regardless of whether the consumer responds to the texts.25 
Another devious technique used by PSMS content providers to seize consumers’ 
phone numbers involves creating deceptive website offers.26  False websites 
constructed by content providers in Florida and California induced consumers to 
enter their mobile phone number in order to claim ‘freebies’ such as Justin Bieber 
tickets, gift cards, and free Apple iPads that the consumers were led to believe they 
had won.27 Instead of receiving the advertised prizes, the consumers were 
unknowingly billed for entirely unrelated services and products.28 
this content was accurate, the consumer was to authorize the purchase by sending an affirmative 
message, in this case “Yes,” to the “12345” shortcode. The consumer would then receive a link to 
the product purchased. 
See SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 13. 
 22. Content providers first must obtain access to consumers’ mobile phone bills from wireless carriers, by 
contracting with “middlemen known as ‘billing aggregators’ who have provided technology to link content 
providers and wireless carriers,” who in turn contract with the wireless carriers. Id at 11. Upon obtaining access 
to the wireless billing platform, content providers billing via PSMS can only charge a specific consumer once the 
consumer texts the content provider the special code associated with the content provider’s product or service, 
“using the mobile device associated with the [consumer’s] wireless account.” See supra text accompanying note 
20; SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 12. Alternatively, a consumer might first enter his or her phone number 
into a content provider’s web advertisement to initiate the process. See Complaint at 8, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 
MDK Media Inc., No. CV14-5099-JFW-SH (C.D. Ca. July 3, 2014) [hereinafter MDK Media] (“For example, a 
consumer who visits a content provider’s web page advertisement . . . may initiate the subscription process by 
entering his or her mobile phone number on that web page advertisement.”). 
 23. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9 (providing “ringtones and recurring text messages containing trivia 
or horoscopes” as examples of content-provider services). 
 24. See MDK Media, supra note 22, at 9 (detailing one “mechanism” by which the defendant content 
provider “obtain[ed] consumers’ mobile phone numbers” by “sending to the consumers’ mobile phones 
unsolicited text messages that many consumers assume have been sent in error”); see also Complaint at 8–9, 
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Tatto Inc., No. CV-08912-DSF-FFM (C.D. Ca. Dec. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Tatto] (noting 
the defendant content provider often sent text messages “containing random factoids or other types of message 
alerts . . . [that] often appear merely to be spam”). 
 25. See, e.g., MDK Media, supra note 22, at 9 (“Defendants begin cramming charges on consumers’ mobile 
phone bills contemporaneous with the sending of these unsolicited text messages.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Tatto, supra note 24, at 9 (alleging the defendant content provider used “misleading website 
offers” to fraudulently “obtain consumers’ phone numbers and . . . sign them up for subscription services”).  
 27. See id. (describing how one defendant’s website first “informed consumers that they had won free 
Justin Bieber tickets, which they could claim by completing an online quiz,” before “direct[ing] the consumer to 
enter his/her cell phone number.”); see also Complaint at 5–8, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Acquinity Interactive 
L.L.C., No. 13-cv-5380 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 2013) [hereinafter Acquinity Interactive] (explaining how the 
defendant-content provider operated a website scheme that offered consumers “purportedly free merchandise,” 
including “$1,000 gift cards to large retailers” and an “Apple iPad,” by sending unsolicited text messages that 
directed consumers to the defendant’s websites and often “represent[ing], expressly or by implication, that the 
consumer receiving the message has won a contest”; these “free merchandise websites” led the consumer to a 
 Caroline E. Sweet 
Vol. 11, No. 1 2016 73 
Content providers seeking to cram consumers via other third-party billing 
platforms also effectively avoid obtaining consumer authorization before billing.29 
“Wireless Application Protocol” billing (“WAP”) allows a content provider to 
“capture[]” a consumer’s mobile phone number from a mobile phone’s “subscriber 
identity module,” also known as a “‘SIM’ card.”30 One cramming content provider 
made millions using WAP billing by running a fake “banner ad[]” within apps on 
Android devices.31 “[D]esigned. . .to look like warning messages generated by the 
Android operating system,” the ad grabbed consumers’ attention by feigning 
detection of a virus on the mobile device and offering to remove it.32 The content 
provider immediately registered consumers who clicked on the “subscribe” button 
after entering the ad (and some who never clicked the “subscribe” button at all) for 
monthly ringtone charges.33 
Crammers using these techniques falsely represent to mobile phone companies 
that the consumers have knowingly authorized their service or product charges.34 
Consequently, crammed charges easily find their way onto millions of consumers’ 
phone bills each year.35 
2. Crammed Charges Are Designedly Difficult to Detect 
In addition to the fact that crammers frequently worm their illegal charges into 
consumer’s phone bills, these charges are extremely difficult to detect. Significantly, 
“registration page” that included an “online form eliciting personal information” such as the consumer’s “cell 
phone number”). 
 28. See Acquinity Interactive, supra note 27, at 9–10 (noting the defendant’s websites “usually” required 
consumers to “complete a total of thirteen (13) offers in order to qualify for the promised free merchandise,” 
many of which entailed “incurring some other obligation, such as applying and qualifying for credit cards,” and 
asserting that “few if any consumers ever receive the promised free merchandise”). 
 29. The FTC sued the content provider Jesta Digital, LLC for running an alleged mobile cramming scheme 
by gaining unauthorized access to consumers’ mobile phone numbers via a “billing technology or process called 
Wireless Application Protocol.” Complaint at 6, 10, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Jesta Digital, L.L.C., No. 13-cv-
01272 (D. D.C. Aug. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Jesta Digital]. 
 30. Id. at 6. 
 31. Id. at 2. In the FTC’s Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Equitable Relief against the content 
provider Jesta Digital, LLC, the FTC alleged that Jesta ran an advertisement for anti-virus software that 
appeared in the free version of the Angry Birds app on Android mobile devices. Id. at 2–3.  
 32. See id. at 3 (“The banner ads contain a robot image that looks similar to the robot logo for the Android 
operating system, state ‘virus detected’ or identify a number of viruses found on the mobile device, and include 
a ‘remove’ button.”). 
 33. See id. at 3–6 (describing the consumer experience when clicking through Jesta’s banner ad and 
explaining that “[w]hen consumers click on the subscribe button or elsewhere on the screen such as the ‘Block 
Mobile Virus Now’ or ‘Protect Your Android Today’ buttons, Jesta charges the consumer $9.99 per month” for 
“ringtones or other goods and services without their authorization or agreement,” including consumers “who 
did not click on the subscribe button.”). 
 34. See, e.g., MDK Media, supra note 22, at 9–10 (asserting that MDK Media “misrepresent[ed] to wireless 
phone carriers” that consumers “knowingly subscribed” to their services and “authorized” MDK Media to place 
charges on consumers’ phone bills). 
 35. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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a majority of consumers do not know that third-parties have access to their mobile 
phone bill.36 Consumers’ virtual cluelessness on this issue is due—at least in part—
to a lack of adequate disclosure by mobile phone carriers.37 Mobile carriers fail to 
inform consumers about third-party billing upon sale of a service plan.38  In 
addition, the FTC has exposed two of the major mobile phone carriers for issuing 
bills that do not adequately and “conspicuously” disclose the presence of third-
party charges.39 The phone bill usually does not identify third-party charges (if it 
identifies them at all)40 until the “middle or towards the end” of the document.41 As 
a result, most consumers are unaware that fraudulent third-party charges may be 
hiding in their phone bill. 
Crammers capitalize on an unknowledgeable consumer base by setting the 
monthly fees for their sham services at small amounts.42 Usually fixed at ten dollars 
or less43 and designed to automatically renew each month,44 the almost unnoticeable 
charge amount45 is highly beneficial to crammers; consumers are more likely to just 
 36. See supra note 6. 
 37. See TRANSCRIPT, supra note 6, at 6–7 (“We also know that consumers often fail to spot unauthorized 
charges on their bills. . . . False [consumers] may read the bill and fail to spot the charges because they’re buried, 
you know, deeply within the bill or listed in generic-sounding categories.”). 
 38. In suits against the wireless carriers AT&T Mobility and T-Mobile USA, the FTC alleged both carriers 
declined to inform consumers that charges for third party services could appear on their phone bills during the 
“sales process.”  Complaint at 4–5, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 14-mi-99999-UNA (N.D. 
Ga. Oct. 8, 2014) [hereinafter AT&T Mobility]; Complaint at 4, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. T-Mobile U.S.A., Inc., 
No. 14-cv-00967 (W.D. Wash. July 1, 2014) [hereinafter T-Mobile U.S.A.]. And in a suit against Sprint 
Corporation, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau alleged Sprint “automatically enrolled customers in 
third-party billing without their consent.” Complaint at 5, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Sprint Corp., No. 14-
cv-9931 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2014) [hereinafter Sprint]. 
 39. See AT&T Mobility, supra note 38, at 5–7 (exposing AT&T’s practice of “lump[ing]” third-party 
charges under the term “‘New Charges’” on its phone bill summary and—in the full bill—listing third-party 
charges under the misleading title “AT&T Monthly Subscriptions”); see also T-Mobile U.S.A., supra note 38, at 
4-9 (describing in detail how near-impossible it is to parse out third-party charges from actual T-Mobile 
charges on either an online bill summary or a “full” phone bill from T-Mobile). 
 40. The FTC stated in its federal action against AT&T that the carrier’s billing format did not include any 
form of disclosure about third-party charges until March of 2013. AT&T Mobility, supra note 38, at 6 (“In 
many instances until at least March 2013, [AT&T’s] online bill has also not provided disclosures in other parts 
of the bill.”). 
 41. See T-Mobile U.S.A., supra note 38, at 8 (“A breakout of the actual third-party charges has typically 
appeared in the middle or towards the end of the [T-Mobile phone] bill, which in some instances may exceed 
50 pages in length.”). 
 42. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 19 (observing from information provided by individual phone 
carriers that “[i]ndividual charges” for third-party content-provider services were “generally small—most often 
ranging from $1 to $20, with frequent reports of a $9.99 recurring monthly charge”). 
 43. See supra note 42. 
 44. See, e.g., Tatto, supra note 24, at 9 (explaining that the fraudulent charges placed by the defendant 
content-provider on consumers’ telephone bills were all automatically “recurring . . . unless and until the 
consumer notices the charge and takes action to unsubscribe”). 
 45. See id. (stating that the “slight variations in [consumers’] bill totals” caused by the defendant’s “$9.99” 
monthly charge “often” went unnoticed by consumers). 
 Caroline E. Sweet 
Vol. 11, No. 1 2016 75 
pay the monthly total, no questions asked.46 As previously noted, when consumers 
do detect and investigate a price change to their phone bill, it is still difficult to 
determine the source of the new charge.47 The confusing way that third-party 
charges appear and are described on most phone bills contributes to this difficulty. 
Often, the charges are not distinguishable from a mobile phone carrier’s own 
service fees.48 Further, when third-party charges are finally listed and described in a 
bill, the service descriptors are nearly indecipherable.49 For example, the following 
image is from an actual T-Mobile phone bill in which the description of a third-










The “Description” of the charge provides no clear information to the consumer 
about its source or substance. 
Confusing billing practices like those above, combined with designedly 
unnoticeable monthly rates, have made it nearly impossible for consumers to 
identify that they have been crammed. Coupled with the ease with which content-
providers can cram phone bills,51 these characteristics make mobile cramming a 
dangerous threat to consumers’ economic well-being.52 
 
 
 46. See id. (noting, because “[m]any consumers have not noticed Defendants’ charges included on their 
phone bills” due to the small dollar amount and the confusing descriptors used, those consumers have merely 
“paid their bills in full”). 
 47. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 48. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 49. Services provided by two of the defendant content-providers in the FTC’s suit against Tatto, Inc., were 
identified by the following “billing descriptor[s]” on mobile phone bills, which consist of a seemingly 
meaningless string of letters and numbers: “77050IQ12CALL8663611606” and “25184USBFIQMIG.” Tatto, 
supra note 24, at 9. 
 50. This image was taken directly from the FTC’s Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other 
Equitable Relief against T-Mobile. T-Mobile U.S.A., supra note 38, at 8–9. 
 51. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 52. Considering crammed charges usually cost $9.99 per month, a consumer that overlooked a single 
fraudulent charge would lose nearly 120 dollars a year. See supra note 42. 
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3. Mobile Cramming Causes Harm Beyond the Individual Consumer 
Mobile cramming not only threatens fraudulent economic harm to millions of 
consumers,53 it also has the potential to ruin a highly beneficial avenue for payment 
transactions. Third-party billing provides consumers with a more secure method of 
paying for services that does not include the transfer of any credit card 
information.54 Since “a billing agreement already exists between a [mobile phone] 
carrier and a user,” content-providers directly receive their portion of the charged 
amount from the consumer’s mobile carrier (instead of the consumer).55 Through 
this billing process, content providers can more easily reach unbanked and 
underbanked consumers in emerging markets, who frequently supplement or 
replace bank accounts with other financial services.56 
II. THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND MOBILE CRAMMING: A 
LOVE(LESS) STORY 
Both Federal and State Governments have acted to combat mobile cramming. The 
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), the Federal Communications Commission, 
and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau have declared cramming to violate 
sections of the FTC Act,57 the Communications Act,58 and the Consumer Financial 
Protection Act,59 respectively.  The FTC alone has instituted numerous enforcement 
actions against mobile crammers and issued best-practices guidelines to the mobile 
 53. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 54. See Ingrid Lunden, Amazon has Turned on Carrier Billing For Apps, in Germany with Bango and O2, 
TECHCRUNCH.COM (Sep. 16, 2014) http://techcrunch.com/2014/09/16/amazon-has-turned-on-bango-carrier-
billing-for-apps-first-in-germany-with-o2/ (reasoning the “logic behind enabling carrier billing” has to do with 
its heightened “security,” because “given the many breaches we have seen around user data and credit card 
information, the idea is that a billing agreement already exists between a carrier and a user, so none of that kind 
of information needs to get shared again”). 
 55. Id. 
 56. See Oded Israeli, The ‘3x factor’ of carrier billing in app store purchases, MOBILE PAYMENTS TODAY (Feb. 
1, 2013) http://www.mobilepaymentstoday.com/blog/9789/The-3X-factor-of- carrier-billing-in-app-store-
purchases (naming “[e]merging markets” the “biggest growth opportunity for [third-party] carrier billing,” 
because “bank accounts and credit cards are not as popular in emerging markets as they are in developed 
markets,” and third-party billing “is the only available electronic payment channel for 1.7 billion people in the 
world, who own a mobile phone but don’t have a bank account”)(emphasis in original). 
 57. 15 U.S.C.S. § 45(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2015) (prohibiting “[u]nfair methods of competition” and “unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce”). In five separate suits against third-party content 
providers alleging mobile cramming, the FTC has claimed the defendant’s practices violated 15 U.S.C. §45(a). 
See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order at 15, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n v. Wise Media, LLC, No. 1:13-CV-1234-WSD (N.D. Ga. Apr. 16, 2013). 
 58. 47 U.S.C.S. § 201(b) (LexisNexis 2015); see FCC NEWS, FCC TO CRAMMERS: NO MORE “MYSTERY FEES” 
(June 16, 2011) (“The FCC has found that cramming is an ‘unjust and unreasonable’ practice that violates 
section 201(b) of the Communications Act.”). 
 59. 12 U.S.C.S. §§ 5531(a), 5536(a)(1)(B) (LexisNexis 2015); see Sprint, supra note 38, at 8 (asserting 
Sprint’s “actions and omissions” in contributing to third-party cramming were “unfair acts and practices in 
violation of §§1031 and 1036(a)(1)(B) of the CFPA”). 
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billing industry.60 Additionally, “multiple state enforcement authorities” have been 
highly committed to stopping crammers.61 Although the FTC has put forth a 
concerted and valiant effort in the fight against mobile cramming,62 consumers 
remain vulnerable to mobile billing fraud.63 In the absence of strict regulation of 
consumer liability, poor mobile-cramming prevention standards have developed 
within the industry.64 
A. Enforcement Actions—Going After the Bad Guys 
Since 2013, the FTC has sued five content providers and two major mobile phone 
companies for purportedly running or participating in mobile cramming schemes.65 
Through these enforcement actions, the FTC levied significant financial penalties 
against individual perpetrators. In four of its five cases against content providers, 
the FTC has achieved sizable monetary judgments.66 In addition, AT&T agreed to 
pay $105 million to settle its case, with $80 million of that amount to be refunded to 
 60. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 61. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, MOBILE CRAMMING STAFF REPORT 12 (2014) [hereinafter FTC STAFF REPORT] 
(noting “Attorneys General of 36 States, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands 
submitted in a comment to the FTC . . . urging action to address mobile cramming” and, additionally, have 
“targeted deceptive practices used to sign up consumers unknowingly for unwanted subscription services” 
through state enforcement actions). 
 62. Because the author will argue that mandatory regulation at the federal level is the necessary solution to 
mobile cramming, and because the FTC has been the most active federal agency in enforcing mobile cramming 
violations, the efforts of the FTC will be the primary focus of this comment. 
 63. See infra Part II.C. 
 64. See infra Part II.C. 
 65. See AT&T Mobility, supra note 38; MDK Media, supra note 22; T-Mobile, U.S.A, supra note 38; Tatto, 
supra note 24; Jesta Digital, supra note 29; Acquinity Interactive, supra note 27; Wise Media, supra note 57. The 
FTC alleged both AT&T Mobility and T-Mobile U.S.A. “engaged in the widespread practice of charging 
consumers for recurring Third-Party Subscriptions without consumers’ authorization for the charges” and 
misrepresented that “charges appearing on [AT&T or T-Mobile’s] phone bills were for [AT&T or T-Mobile’s] 
services. . .even when the charges were unauthorized charges for Third-Party Subscriptions.” AT&T Mobility, 
supra note 38, at 19–20; T-Mobile, U.S.A, supra note 38, at 14. 
 66. See Final Order For Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment at 4, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. MDK 
Media, No. 2:14-cv-05099-JFW-MRW (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2015) (ordering the defendant MDK Media to pay 
$383,000 to the Commission); Operators of Massive Mobile Cramming Scheme Will Surrender More Than $10M 
in Assets in FTC Settlement, FED. TRADE COMM’N (June 13, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2014/06/operators-massive-mobile-cramming-scheme-will-surrender-more-10m (reporting that the 
FTC reached a “partially suspended” $150 million settlement with all defendants in the Tatto lawsuit, including 
the surrender of assets valued at “more than $10 million”); Mobile Crammers Settle FTC Charges of 
Unauthorized Billing, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2013/11/mobile-crammers-settle-ftc-charges-unauthorized-billing (noting a partially suspended 
judgment of $10,965,638 had been entered against the defendants in the FTC’s suit against Wise Media); Jesta 
Digital Settles FTC Complaint it Crammed Charges on Consumer’s Mobile Phone Bills, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Aug. 
21, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/08/jesta-digital-settles-ftc-complaint-it-
crammed-charges-consumers (announcing the defendant Jesta Digital was ordered to pay $1.2 million to the 
Commission, in addition to providing refunds to crammed consumers). 
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customers.67 T-Mobile eventually followed AT&T’s lead in 2015, reaching a 
settlement of $90 million with the FTC.68 These massive settlements with T-Mobile 
U.S.A. and AT&T Mobility raised public awareness of mobile cramming by 
garnering media coverage in major news outlets.69 
B. The FTC’s Attempt to Guide the Industry 
In addition to suing mobile crammers, the FTC also issued a list of general 
recommendations for “best practices” to the mobile billing industry.70 These 
recommendations are mostly directed at mobile carriers, and include: (1) informing 
consumers that third-parties may charge their phone bill upon “activation,” and 
providing consumers with “the option to block all third-party charges on their 
phone accounts,” or to “block or allow. . .specific providers”; (2) adopting 
“reasonable procedures” to detect and take action against “risky or suspicious” 
content providers; (3) implementing “more centralized control” over the consumer 
“opt-in” authorization process; (4) providing “non-deceptive,” clear, and 
conspicuous disclosure of all third-party charges on a consumer’s phone bill, such 
as “providing separate subtotals for carrier and third-party charges” or sending 
“separate notification” of third-party charges to consumers who “auto-pay” their 
bills; and (5) creating a “clear and consistent” dispute resolution process for 
consumers who discover questionable charges on their mobile phone bill, including 
giving consumers the right to “withhold payment” on any disputed charges “during 




 67. Jim Puzzanghera, AT&T to Refund $80 Million in Settlement of Mobile Cramming Case, LA TIMES, (Oct. 
8, 2014, 10:50 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-tn-att-settlement-mobile-cramming-federal-trade-
commission-20141008-story.html. It is also worth noting that the Federal Communications Commission, 
working jointly with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and State Attorneys General, recently secured 
settlements from Sprint Corporation ($68 million) and Verizon Communications Inc. ($90 million) to close 
mobile cramming investigations into both carriers. See FCC NEWS, VERIZON & SPRINT TO PAY $158 MILLION TO 
SETTLE MOBILE CRAMMING INVESTIGATIONS (2015), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
333427A1.pdf. 
 68. Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment at 10, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. T-
Mobile, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-00967-JLR (W.D. Wa. Dec. 19, 2014). 
 69. Edward Wyatt, AT&T Mobility to Pay $105 Million to Settle Unlawful Billing Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 
2014, at B3; Brian Fung, For $90 million, T-Mobile will Settle FTC Charges That it Slipped Bogus Fees onto 
Wireless Bills, THE SWITCH BLOG (Dec. 19, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2014/12/19/for-90-million-t-mobile-will-settle-ftc-charges-that-it-slipped-bogus-fees-into-wireless-
bills/. 
 70. FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 61, at i–ii. 
 71. Id. at i–ii, 34. 
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C. Something is Missing: The FTC’s Regulatory Approach is Not Strong Enough to 
Combat Mobile Cramming 
For two important reasons, the FTC’s endeavors to thwart mobile cramming have 
not adequately protected consumers. First, while the FTC has secured economic 
remedies for some consumers through monetary judgments against—and 
settlements with—content-providers and mobile carriers, these only compensated 
injured consumers for a form of mobile cramming that virtually no longer exists.72 
Second, the financial incentive within the mobile billing industry to allow mobile 
cramming to occur is too strong for voluntary recommendations to curb;73 
consequently, phone companies’ fraud-monitoring practices are abysmal.74 
1. Enforcement Actions Have Only Compensated Consumers for Harm from Outdated 
Forms of Mobile Cramming 
With the exception of its action against the content provider Jesta Digital, LLC, the 
FTC has only sued content providers that used the PSMS form of third-party billing 
to cram consumers.75 This form of billing has practically disappeared today,76 while 
other billing platforms are rapidly growing in popularity.77 The FTC’s lone suit 
against a WAP-billing content provider illustrates that cramming is just as possible 
with these alternative billing platforms.78 The FTC should not make consumers wait 
for new schemes to befall them before crammers are brought to justice. Therefore, 
the FTC cannot successfully combat mobile cramming through threat of lawsuit 
alone.79 
2. Substandard Fraud-Monitoring Programs within the Mobile Billing Industry Result 
Along with the inherent weaknesses in deterring mobile cramming via lawsuits 
against individual perpetrators, the FTC’s “best practices” recommendations have 
failed to inspire effective industry self-regulation of mobile cramming because the 
recommendations are merely guidelines.80 
 72. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 73. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 74. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 75. See MDK Media, supra note 22, at 7; Tatto, supra note 24, at 8; Jesta Digital, supra note 29 and 
accompanying text; Acquinity Interactive, supra note 27, at 5–8; Wise Media, supra note 57, at 5. 
 76. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 61, at 4 (noting the “Premium SMS market ha[d] been declining in 
size over the past few years” due to “the emergence of mobile apps” and will “continue to shrink” because “the 
four largest mobile carriers pledged to discontinue Premium SMS billing for commercial transactions” in 2013).  
 77. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 37–38 (stating that one form of third-party billing known as 
“[d]irect carrier billing . . . increased 30% year-over-year from 2009-2012” and is now offered by “the Google 
Play store” along with “Sony, Facebook, Skype, and Rhapsody”). 
 78. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 79. See supra Part II.A. 
 80. See infra note 81–102 and accompanying text. 
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Three of the four major mobile carriers have been accused of making hundreds 
of millions of dollars in profit from third-party charges, authorized and 
unauthorized alike.81 Currently, carriers “generally collect[] 30% to 40% of the total 
value” of all third-party charges billed,82 and accumulate additional profit from 
“fees” levied against content providers with frequent customer refunds.83 These 
numbers show that abolishing mobile cramming would extinguish a significant 
revenue source for the mobile billing industry. Up against a financial temptation 
this strong, the FTC’s regulatory efforts are not enough. Because the threat of legal 
action is currently the lone to not perpetuate mobile cramming,84 mobile carriers 
are encouraged to bet against getting caught.85 
A snapshot of the ineffective fraud monitoring and prevention practices of some 
of the major mobile carriers illustrates this point. Any content provider seeking to 
use third-party billing must pass a “vetting” process established by the Wireless 
Association (“CTIA”).86 The major mobile carriers additionally employ their own 
pre-screening system to determine which merchants should be granted billing 
access.87 For content-providers that billed via PSMS, the pre-screening process 
evaluated compliance with certain specific standards issued by the CTIA.88 
Additionally, the CTIA would conduct audits for compliance with these standards.89 
As early as 2010, the Association would publish reports summarizing the results of 
its audits and alert mobile carrier companies to merchants exhibiting excessive 
violations.90 
 81. See Sprint, supra note 38, at 2 (“While its customers suffered losses, Sprint retained 40% of the gross 
revenue it collected for third-party charges, totaling hundreds of millions of dollars.”); see also AT&T Mobility, 
supra note 38, at 4 (“In 2012, Defendant earned $108 million from charges for Third-Party Subscriptions, and 
in 2013, $161 million for such charges, many of which were unauthorized”); T-Mobile USA, supra note 38, at 4 
(“Defendant has earned hundreds of millions of dollars from Third-Party Subscriptions” and  “caused 
consumers millions of dollars of injury”). 
 82. SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 19. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See supra Part II.A. 
 85. Especially when the generally undetectable nature of crammed charges is considered. See supra Part I.B. 
 86. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 15 (stating that the “CTIA in conjunction with an outside auditor 
would vet content providers that were to seeking to . . . market and charge products to consumers”). 
 87. See id. at 16 (explaining that mobile carriers reported to the Committee that they also conducted 
“vetting” of third-party merchants “beyond the CTIA vetting process”). 
 88. These standards primarily involved advertising disclosure requirements—especially regarding the 
placement of pricing information—but they also required third-party merchants to obtain “two-factor 
authentication” from a consumer before placing any charges on the consumer’s mobile phone bill. Id. at 14. 
 89. See id. at 15 (“Content providers that are permitted to charge consumers via the PSMS system have 
been subject to ongoing CTIA monitoring for compliance with industry standards.”). 
 90. See id. (detailing how carriers were granted “access to an online portal that provided the results of these 
reviews—or audits—in reports that detailed why and how guidelines were violated,” and  additionally 
“receiv[ed] email notification of new audit findings and weekly reports aggregating the audit failures across the 
mobile content market,” including identification of “content” that had “the most failures”). 
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In spite of these measures, enforcing compliance with PSMS standards and 
punishing violators remained entirely at the discretion of the mobile carriers.91 The 
enforcement policies employed by carriers were neither uniform nor strict.92 For 
example, while most carriers monitored the refund rates of content providers93 as a 
method of identifying fraudulent behavior, the threshold number of refunds that 
triggered sanctions were set at high levels and differed from company to company.94 
Additionally, under some programs, sanctioned content providers were allowed to 
continue charging currently-subscribed consumers; only the ability to obtain new 
subscriptions was temporarily prohibited.95 Violators generally remained free to 
charge consumers for every other service that had not exceeded the refund rate 
threshold.96 
More importantly, forms of third-party billing other than PSMS are currently 
subject only to the pre-screening, monitoring, and sanction policies of individual 
mobile carriers.97 It should be noted that today AT&T, Sprint, T-Mobile, and 
Verizon do allow consumers the opportunity to completely block all third-party 
charges for free.98 AT&T also offers its customers the option to receive text message 
or email notifications any time a purchase from a third-party is billed to the 
customer’s AT&T account.99 Unfortunately, all of these services are buried in the 
 91. See id. (providing that “[u]nder [the current] system, each carrier has been responsible for determining 
what follow up they would conduct” with the “violating” content provider). 
 92. Id. at 30–35. 
 93. In the context of third-party billing, ‘refund rate’ refers to “the ratio of a carrier’s refunds [to 
consumers] to charges billed [by a particular content provider] for a particular period of time.” See FTC STAFF 
REPORT, supra note 61, at 13. 
 94. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 30–31 (reporting AT&T’s threshold was an 18% refund rate 
coupled with a failed audit, Verizon’s threshold to be between 5% and 7.99%, Sprint’s threshold for levying 
financial penalties at 12%, and T-Mobile’s threshold rate as 15%). 
 95. See id. (noting that under Verizon’s program, “[b]illing aggregator documents indicate that the policy 
[for threshold-exceeding content providers] . . . was that suspension . . . meant a bar on acquiring new 
subscribers,” and also noting that T-Mobile employed a similar procedure) (emphasis in original). 
 96. See id. Verizon’s program was the sole exception, with its policy being a suspension of “all PSMS 
campaigns managed by” the content provider. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 97. See id. at 38 (“With respect to direct carrier billing, to date there are no industry-wide best practices or 
central monitoring similar to what was in place for PSMS. Instead, oversight of direct carrier billing occurs at 
the individual carrier level.”). 
 98. Wireless Support: About AT&T Purchase Blocker, 
AT&T.COM, http://www.att.com/esupport/article.jsp?sid=KB92822&cv=820&br=BR&ct=9005842&pv=2#fbid=
QoR_iz4fbDF (last visited Dec. 13, 2015); Support: Find out About Third-
Party Billing, SPRINT.COM, http://support.sprint.com/support/article/Find_out_about_Premium_Messaging/cas
ecx832318 20091116 142129?ECID=vanity:premiummessaging&question_box=third%20party%20charges&id1
6=third%20party%20charges#!/ (last updated Nov. 17, 2014); T-Mobile Support: 
Apps, Downloads, and Other Content Purchases FAQs, TMOBILE.COM (last modified July 9, 2015, 2:43 PM); Supp
ort: Carrier Billing FAQs, VERIZONWIRELESS.COM, http://www.verizonwireless.com/support/carrier-billing-faqs/ 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2015). 
 99. Wireless Support Billing Notifications, AT&T.COM, 
http://www.att.com/esupport/article.jsp?sid=KB425044 (last visited Oct. 29, 2015).  
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‘Support’ sections of the carriers’ websites.100 This makes it highly likely that only a 
consumer with previous knowledge of third-party billing or one who had already 
discovered a suspicious third-party charge on his or her account would be able to 
locate their carrier’s purchase-blocking option.101 Since most consumers are wholly 
unaware of third-party billing,102 the major mobile carriers’ efforts in this respect do 
little to prevent mobile cramming in emerging billing platforms. 
With the current state of mobile cramming prevention in mind, it is time to look 
elsewhere for a model of fraud regulation that will work. 
III. SOLVING THE PROBLEM: A FEDERALLY-MANDATED CAP ON 
CONSUMER LIABILITY FOR MOBILE CRAMMING 
In order to fully shield consumers from the hidden danger of mobile cramming, 
Congress should enact legislation (and the FTC should accordingly implement 
regulations) that imposes a cap on consumer liability for fraudulent phone bill 
charges.103 The Federal Government successfully applied this strategy in regulating 
consumer credit card fraud.104 A consumer liability limit will be equally successful in 
regulating mobile cramming because both industries have similar financial 
incentives with respect to fraud.105 
A. Modeling the Regulation of Credit Card Fraud Will Provide Consumers With 
Adequate Protection from Mobile Cramming 
Currently, mobile carriers provide little protection to consumers from mobile 
cramming. However, the FTC can transform consumers’ vulnerability in this area 
by emulating the treatment of consumer fraud in another market: credit card 
transactions.  Mobile cramming and credit card fraud constitute a similar form of 
consumer fraud—unauthorized use of a payment transaction.106 In addition, the 
credit card and mobile billing industries have notable similarities in financial 
motives and structure.107 Both credit card companies (along with the banks that 
 100. See supra notes 98–99. To discover what options AT&T, Sprint, T-Mobile, and Verizon offered to their 
customers regarding third-party charges, this author (who brought with her all of the knowledge on mobile 
cramming gained from writing this comment) went to each carrier’s website, located the ‘Support’ section, and 
had to either type “third-party charges” into the section’s search box or navigate through sub-sections until 
information regarding third-party charges appeared. 
 101. See supra note 100. 
 102. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 103. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 104. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 105. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 106. Third-party billing qualifies as a payment-transaction because it is a means of paying for services or 
products through charging the value of the service or product purchased to the consumer’s mobile phone bill. 
See supra Part I. 
 107. See infra notes 108–10 and accompanying text. 
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issue their cards) and mobile phone carriers have a significant financial stake in the 
occurrence of fraud; each industry player retains a portion of every charge posted to 
a credit card or mobile phone account, respectively.108 Credit card companies and 
their issuing banks receive 2% on average per transaction, compared to the 30-40% 
of third-party charges retained by mobile carriers.109 Further, credit card companies 
and mobile carriers similarly monitor refund or “chargeback” rates to identify 
suspicious merchants and potential instances of fraud.110 Accordingly, the FTC 
should not treat third-party mobile billing fraud differently than credit card fraud. 
If the FTC enacts a limit on consumer liability for cramming similar to the 
federally-mandated cap on credit card fraud,111 government and industry efforts to 
prevent cramming will improve. 
1. The Success of the Consumer Liability Cap on Credit Card Fraud: Shifting the 
Financial Burden Away from Consumers 
Regulation of credit card fraud essentially stems from two sources of governance: 
(1) the Fair Credit Billing Act112 and (2) policies privately implemented by 
individual credit card companies.113 As discussed below, the nature of the Fair 
Credit Billing Act has influenced credit card companies to adopt strict fraud-
prevention policies. 
a. The Fair Credit Billing Act 
The Fair Credit Billing Act (“FCBA”) regulates credit card billing practices by 
granting consumers certain protections in billing disputes with their credit card 
 108. See Amad Ebrahimi, The Complete Guide to Credit Card Processing Rates & Fees, MERCHANTMAVERICK 
(Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.merchantmaverick.com/the-complete-guide-to-credit-card-processing-rates-and-
fees/ (explaining that credit card companies and “card-issuing banks” charge “Interchange Reimbursement Fees 
and Assessments,” which are charged to merchants for each “[credit card] transaction,” and noting such fees 
“typically consist of a percentage of each transaction accompanied by a flat per transaction fee (2.10% + .10)”); 
supra note 82 and accompanying text.  
 109. See supra note 108. 
 110. See Ken Musante, Understanding Chargeback Rules, THE GREEN SHEET (The Green Sheet Inc., Rohnert 
Park, CA) July 27, 2009, at 68 (explaining how Visa Inc. and MasterCard WorldWide have 
“implemented. . .specific chargeback monitoring programs” and “fraud identification” programs that identify 
offenders of the companies’ established chargeback “limits” and “ratios.”); see infra Part III.A.1.b.  
 111. See infra Part III.A.1.a.  
 112. 15 U.S.C.S. § 1666–1666j (LexisNexis 2015). Fraudulent charges to a consumer’s credit card bill qualify 
as a type of “billing error” under 15 U.S.C.S. § 1666, subject to the provisions of that section. See id. § 
1666(b)(1)–(3) (stating that a “billing error” consists of “a reflection on a statement of an extension of credit 
which was not made to the obligor, or if made, was not in the amount reflected on such statement” as well as “a 
reflection on a statement of goods or services not accepted by the obligor or his designee or not delivered to the 
obligor or his designee in accordance with the agreement made at the time of transaction”). 
 113. See infra Part III.A.1.b. 
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provider.114 Most important among these protections is a cap on consumer liability 
for charges not authorized by the cardholder115 (referred to as a “billing error” 
under the Act).116 Under the FCBA, a consumer cannot be held liable to a creditor 
for any amount over fifty dollars that is attributable to unauthorized charges to 
their credit card bill.117 If the credit card provider finds after investigating the 
“billing error” that the disputed charges are correct, the Act requires the provider to 
supply the consumer with a “written explanation” and “documentary evidence” 
supporting this finding.118 Additionally, the Act grants consumers the right to 
withhold payment of a disputed charge during a dispute investigation.119 
These provisions grant universal protection to consumers in the credit card 
industry by shifting the financial burden of fraud from the consumer to the credit 
card company: 
In fact, the best part of the credit card industry regulations, the so-called 
Truth in Lending Act [as amended by the Fair Credit Billing Act], is the 
part that says your liability by law is limited only to $50. That forces the 
companies, all of them, to do a good job fighting fraud, because they have to 
eat it.120 
By shifting the risk of loss caused by fraud to the credit card companies, the FCBA 
liability cap directly shields consumers from liability exceeding fifty dollars and 
incentivizes the credit card companies to protect themselves by proactively 
preventing such losses. The vast difference between credit card companies’ and 
mobile carriers’ fraud-monitoring practices, as described below, illustrates how 
influential a federally-mandated consumer liability limit can be. 
 
 114. The Fair Credit Billing Act applies to a creditor’s obligations after receiving “written notice” from a 
customer that the customer’s statement contains an alleged “billing error.” 15 U.S.C.S. § 1666(a).  
 115. See id. § 1666(e) (“[T]he amount required to be forfeited under this subsection may not exceed $50”); 
see also Consumer Information: Disputing Credit Card Charges, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Aug., 2012), 
http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0219-disputing-credit-card-charges [hereinafter Consumer Information] 
(“Federal law limits your responsibility for unauthorized charges to $50.”).  
 116. See supra note 112. 
 117. See supra note 115. 
 118. 15 U.S.C.S. § 1666(a)(B)(ii). 
 119. See id. § 1666(d) (“[A] creditor . . . may not, prior to the sending of the written explanation or 
clarification required under paragraph (B)(ii), restrict or close an account with respect to which the obligor has 
indicated pursuant to subsection (a) that he believes such account to contain a billing error solely because of the 
obligor’s failure to pay the amount indicated to be in error.”). The credit card provider also may not “threaten 
your credit rating, report you as delinquent, accelerate your debt. . .[or] discriminate against [consumers] who 
exercise their rights in good faith under the FCBA.” Consumer Information, supra note 115. 
 120. Frontline, Secret History of the Credit Card: Interview with Edmund Mierzwinski, PBS (Nov. 23, 2004), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/credit/interviews/mierzwinski.html. 
 Caroline E. Sweet 
Vol. 11, No. 1 2016 85 
b. Subsequent Adoption of Strict Fraud-Monitoring Programs 
Credit card companies employ far more stringent monitoring programs for fraud 
than programs currently used by mobile phone companies. Credit card companies 
focus primarily on the amount of “chargeback[s]” granted by a particular merchant 
to consumers121—the functional equivalent of “refund rates” in the mobile third-
party billing context.122 However, most of the major credit card companies 
investigate merchants when chargeback rates exceed 1%123 (with some even 
lower);124 this is a fraction of the refund thresholds that mobile carriers use to trigger 
an investigation into a content provider (ranging from 5% to nearly 20%).125 
Under VISA’s monitoring program,126 first-time violators receive a warning.127 A 
second violation prompts severe “financial penalties”128 unless chargebacks are 
reduced below the threshold within a certain period of time.129 Merchants cannot 
exit the monitoring program until acceptable chargeback rates are maintained for 
“three consecutive months,”130 and permanent termination from accepting VISA 
credit cards can occur following nine months of excessive chargebacks.131 
VISA concurrently operates a more severe chargeback-monitoring program for 
merchants identified as “high-risk.”132 Merchants designated to this program do not 
receive a first-time warning133 and are subject to instant penalties at higher rates.134 
Additionally, VISA tracks “issuer reported” fraudulent transactions in order to 
“more quickly identify problem merchants.”135 
 121. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9, at 14 (noting that “credit card networks” use chargeback rates to 
“root out unauthorized charges”); see also VISA, CHARGEBACK MANAGEMENT 
GUIDELINES FOR VISA MERCHANTS 11 (2015), https://usa.visa.com/dam/VCOM/download/merchants/chargebac
k-management-guidelines-for-visa-merchants.pdf (defining a “‘chargeback’” as the “return [of] a disputed 
transaction” to the customer). 
 122. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 123. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9, at 14. 
 124. Musante, supra note 110, at 68, 70 (stating MasterCard’s monitoring program maintains a chargeback 
rate threshold of only 0.5%). 
 125. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 126. MasterCard implements “similar programs” to Visa’s. Musante, supra note 110. 
 127. VISA, supra note 121, at 39 (The “[f]irst notification of excessive chargebacks for a specific merchant is 
considered a warning.”). 
 128. Id.; see also Musante, supra note 110 (noting Visa’s financial penalties for chargeback violators can 
include $5,000 to $10,000 “[f]ines” and a $50-per-chargeback fine that increases the longer a merchant remains 
in the program). 
 129. Musante, supra note 110. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. VISA, supra note 121, at 40 (citing “direct marketers, adult content, online pharmacies, gambling 
merchants, outbound telemarketers” and “travel services” as examples of “high-risk” merchants). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Musante, supra note 110. 
 135. Id. 
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These monitoring programs are superior to mobile cramming detection 
practices in numerous ways: (1) lower chargeback thresholds detect fraudulent 
merchants much earlier; (2) larger financial penalties for excessive chargebacks 
create a greater deterrent to fraudulent practices; and (3) gathering information 
from sources beyond chargeback rates increases the chances of detecting and 
preventing all fraudulent behavior. These monitoring programs provide consumers 
with greater protection from fraud—an indirect result of the FCBA’s consumer 
liability cap. 
2. Copy and Paste: Applying a Federally-Mandated Consumer Liability Limit to the 
Mobile Billing Industry 
Enacting a concrete limit on consumer liability for mobile cramming will provide 
consumers with the same level of protection they enjoy from credit card fraud. The 
financial incentive for mobile phone carriers to promote mobile cramming136 
demands a powerful counter-motivation. Money talks; the Federal Government 
must make the mobile billing industry fearful of having to “eat it” too.137 This means 
making mobile cramming prevention a principle economic interest of phone 
companies and content providers. Credit card regulation has successfully 
accomplished this via the FCBA consumer liability cap.138 Implementing the same 
cap on mobile cramming liability will similarly prompt committed, consumer-
protection action from the mobile carriers. Accordingly, the Federal Government 
would be remiss not to repeat this approach in the mobile billing industry. 
3. Additional Benefits Will Flow from a Consumer Liability Cap 
In addition to shielding consumers from economic harm, a consumer liability cap 
on mobile cramming will foster greater consumer trust in third-party billing as a 
legitimate form of payment. Consumer trust is noted as integral to economic 
success and adoption of a service,139 and is considered especially important in 
 136. See supra note 81–83 and accompanying text. 
 137. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 138. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 139. See Amanda Vickers & Jackie Smith, Why Consumer Trust is the Key to Repeat Business, THE WISE 
MARKETER (Jan. 2005), http://www.thewisemarketer.com/features/read.asp?id=54 (advising that “[t]hose 
looking to build lasting customer relationships must keep the old saying ‘Trust is hard won and easily lost’ 
constantly in their minds,” and stating that “profit depends to a surprisingly large extent upon” consumer 
trust); see also CHRIS HALLIBURTON & ADINA POENARU, THE ROLE OF TRUST IN 
CONSUMER RELATIONSHIPS 3 (2010) (noting that “[t]rust is key in guaranteeing the success of business 
relationships, particularly those characterized by high degrees of risk, uncertainty and vulnerability, like 
services,” because trust gains “consumer loyalty, which in turn leads to a longer term relationship, greater share 
of wallet, and higher advocacy or word-of-mouth”). 
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“‘service-rich’ organizations” like the financial and mobile industries.140 The history 
of credit card fraud regulation exemplifies these principles. Since the current federal 
regulations were implemented, the credit card exploded into a trillion dollar 
industry141 due to an increase in consumer trust in plastic as a payment alternative.142 
Experts argue that the FCBA’s consumer liability limit for unauthorized credit card 
charges was the catalyst in garnering this trust.143 Likewise, implementing a limit on 
consumer liability for mobile cramming will increase perceptions of security and 
foster greater consumer adoption of mobile third-party billing. 
CONCLUSION 
Mobile cramming is a fraudulent practice that continues to threaten millions of 
consumers.144 Currently, the Federal Trade Commission’s efforts to regulate fraud in 
the mobile billing industry afford little protection and enable lax industry policies.145  
To successfully insulate consumers from mobile cramming, the Federal Trade 
Commission must enact legally-mandated limits on consumer liability for crammed 
charges that are similar to those implemented by federal credit card regulation.146 
Both consumers and companies in the mobile billing industry will reap the benefits 
of such legislation.147 
 
 140. See HALLIBURTON & POENARU, supra note 139, at 1 (“For service businesses, especially ‘service-rich’ 
organizations who have multiple customer contacts, or touch points, often over a long time period, this issue 
[of consumer trust] is even more critical.”). 
 141. Payments made by U.S. consumers with credit cards issued by the country’s seven largest lenders 
totaled over $1.84 trillion in 2014. Trefis Team, Q4 2014 Bank Review: Credit Card Payment 
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